Jean-Paul Chavas
There is little doubt that equity considerations play some role in human decision making. This can be seen through statements that " we are all created equal," or that "we have equal rights ." Thi s can also be seen through some of the transfer mechanisms that societies are willing to put in place for the benefits of the poor or the malnourished . In spite of this evidence, the role of equity in resource allocation remains poorly understood. Most economic analyses tend to focus on efficiency issues and avoid addressing distribution issues. As argued by Sen (1987 Sen ( , 1992 , as long as human behavior is affected by equity considerations, it seems that economics could be made more productive by paying greater attention to welfare distribution. At the center of equity is whether and how to distinguish between people in terms of their needs, their abilities, their contributions, and their individual rights. People being different, at least some of their differences seem to be relevant to the economic evaluation of equity issues. At this point, it remains somewhat unclear how to approach such issues.
The current debate about equity has been profoundly influenced by Rawls's Theory of Justice. Rawls's theory is based on the concept of justice as fairness. I It relies on a so-called "original position" where individuals do not yet know their exact position in society. Rawls suggests that a society is just if its current members would find the "original position" fair. Rawls's views have been influential, yet controversial. Part of the debate comes in part from some antagonism between equity, and rights (e.g., Nozick). And private property rights are often seen as contributing to inequalitie s of wealth in modern society. The objective of thi s paper is to explore equity issues, with a special focus on interactions between efficiency, equity, and the role of information in resource allocation. In the ne xt section, we first review a characterization of Pareto-efficient 2 allocations under uncertainty. We then introduce equity considerations in the analysis . Being motivated in part by Rawls's work, this is done by relying on a fairness criterion, as a complement to Pareto optima lity. The usefulness of our approach is then illu s trated by a few applications to economic and policy analysis. The applications emphasize the influence of information and property rights in the evaluation of efficiency and equity issues . They also provide useful insights in the role of market and non market mechanisms in resource allocation .
Efficient Allocation
Consider a social group constituted of n individuals . These n individuals make decisions concerning production, time allocation, and consumption activities under uncertainty. The uncertainty is represented by states of nature.
Let e j denote the jth state of nature, and E = {e l , ... , eM} be the finite set of mutually exclusive states of nature, where M is the total number of possible states. The states being mutually exclusive, only one state will eventually occur. However, it is typically not known ahead of time which state the n individuals will encounter. Throughout the paper, the M states represent all possible sources of risk facing the group, including both production-related uncertainties as well as consumption-related uncertainties. Also, they can represent lack of infor-mation about the characteristics of the individuals in the group, FinaJiy, in a dynamic setting, the states can reflect learning as new information becomes available over time,
We will be interested here in partitions of the set E = (el, "" eM) as a basis for evaluating the information used to evaluate decision-making and its welfare implications, Define a partition P of (e l , "" eM ) as a set composed of 5 elements {PI' " " Ps}, 1:S: 5:S: M, such that
Ps n Ps' = 0 for all s *-s', uslPs:
For a given partition P = (PI' "" Ps), 5 can be interpreted as tbe total number of observable si gnals or messages, These signals provide information on the states of nature, In particular, observing the sth signal means knowing that the true state is in p" the sth element of the partition P, but without being able to tell which state in Ps is the actual one . At one extreme, 5 = M is the case of perfect information where each element of P corresponds to a different state of nature, At the other extreme, 5 = I corresponds to "no information" where the only element of P is the set E itself. In general, the quality of information improves (deteriorates) as the partition P becomes finer (coarser), This can be formalized as follows, DEFINITION 1. An information structure P' is at least as fine as P if, for every PEP and p' E P', eitherp'kP orp np'= 0 , Intuitively, a finer partition is associated with the observation of new signals providing additional information about which states might occur within each element of the partition ,
The economic decisions are as follows, The production decisions involve labor and capital allocation used in the production of consumer goods , Let x be the vector of capital goods used in the production process, and t = (tu; i = 1, .. " n; j = 1, .. " J) be the vector of labor inputs, where tu denotes the Jabor spent by the ith individual on the jth activity, j = 1, .. " J, J being the total number of labor activities, Also, denote by hi the amount of leisure used by the ith individual, i = 1, .. " n, Finally, let Yi be the vector of consumer goods consumed by the ith individual. These consumer goods Y = (YI' .. " Yn) are outputs of a production process using capital inputs x and labor inputs t. The allocation thus involves choosing the vector z == (y. h, t, x), The vector z can be alternatively expressed
where Zk is the kth decision variable, k = 1, .. " K, K denoting the total number of decision variables,
We consider the general case where each decision variable may be based on a different information structure, This can be due to asymmetric information across individuals and/or learning over time , Let P k be the information partition associated with the kth decision Zk' k = 1, .. " K. In general, denote by Zk(e m ) the kth decision made in the mth state of nature, k = 1, .. " K, and m = 1, .. " M , This allows for the use of different amounts of information about the state of nature for different economic decisions, The information partition P k = (Pkl> Pk2> .. , ) imposes the following restriction on behavior:
Zk(e",) = Zk(e",.) if both em and em' are in Pks for all m, m' = 1, .. " M; for all Ph E P k ; and for all k = 1, .. " K, Equation (1) shows how the choice Zk depends on the information partition P k ava ilable at the time of the decision, Since imperfect information means that it is not possible to distingui sh between the states within each element Pks of the partition P k , equation (1) states that the corresponding decision Zk cannot depend on the specific states in P ks ' At one extreme, perfect information corresponds to the partition P k = Ie" .. " eM), implying that the decision Zk is made ex post after the actual state is observed, In this case, equation (1) Let tJ = (P" .. " P K ) denote the information structure associated with the choice of z = (z"
.. " ZK), where P k is the partition associated with the kth decision variable, Zk ' The issue considered here is how to choose the decision vector z = (Z, ' .. " ZK) == (Y. h, t, x), along with the information structure tJ, Endogenizing the information structure tJ will allow LIS to investigate below the role of information and learning in resource allocation, First, the choice of z and tJ mu s t be feasible, This is characterized by a feasible set representing the technology and constraints facing the group of n individuals. Under the mth state of nature, this feas ible set is denoted by F(e",) , where
The set F is assumed to be nonempty and compact . It can represent a general multi-input multi-output aggregate technology. The state of nature e", in (2) reflects possible uncertainty in the underlying production process . In the case where the vector z includes information gathering activities (e.g., through the time allocation t), the feasible set F a lso represents the learning process. This allows for a joint technology, where outputs yare jointly produced with the information structure tJ (e.g., as would be the case under "learning by doing").
As (a, tJ) , e) be the corresponding utility level for the ith individual, i = I, ... , n. In general, the allocation Z*(a, tJ) depends on both a and tJ· Following the arguments presented in proposition 1, as the a 's vary between 0 and I, Z*(a, tJ) generates a set of con strained-Pareto , A s s uc h, the function L;eX,V;(') could be interpre ted a s a B e(gson~Sa mu e l so n soc ial we lfare fun ction. This ra ises the issue of determining the indi vi du al welfare we ights Ct.
optimal allocations, while the utility levels
out the constrained-Pareto utility frontier, the constraint being that the information structure f.J is treated as fixed. This provides a basis for investigating the issue of how the information structure f.J affects the utility frontier U*(a, f.J). For that purpose, consider two information structures f.J = (PI' ... , P K ) and f.J' = (P/, ... , P/). We will say that f.J' is at least as fine as f.J if P/ is as least as fine as P k for all k = 1, ... , K (see definition 1). Also, we will say that information is costless if any information structure f.J' that is finer than f.J remains feasible in the sense that {z: Proposition 2 states that better (costless) information (as reflected by a finer information structure) tends to improve efficiency. This can be interpreted to mean that the social value of costless information is always nonnegative. At worst, improved information may not be used and would have no effect on resource allocation . And if the information is used, it would be a Pareto improvement that shifts out the Pareto utility frontier. This corresponds to a situation where more costless information is necessarily better in the sense of improving the efficiency of resource allocation. Alternatively stated, lack of information would necessarily result in inefficient allocations. This is consistent with the extensive literature on the negative welfare effects of moral hazard and adverse selection under imperfect information.
Proposition 2 suggests that, in general, there are economic incentives to obtain more costless information. However, it should be kept in mind that such results do not apply when information is costly. In this case, the evaluation of information involves comparing its cost and its benefit. If information cost is large, then obtaining information may not be optimal. It is only when the benefit of information outweighs , To prove proposilion 2, nOle Ih al p', being al leasl as fine as p, in equal ion (I) is al leasl as restrictive under p compared to p'. Ii follows Ihat, under coslless information, Ihe fea sible region for Z in Ihe maximizalion prob lem (5) is al Jeast as Jarge under p' than fP. The resu li s fo llow.
the cost that it is optimal to learn. The optimal learning is then represented by the optimal information structure f.J *(a) obtained as the solution to the optimization problem (4).
In general, both f.J*(a) and Z*(CY.) in (4) depend on a. This implies the existence of multiple Pareto optimal allocations: one efficient allocation for each value of a. In this case, the Pareto-optimality criterion falls short of providing precise guidance on which allocation should be recommended. It generates a class of efficient decisions, but with no basis for choosing among them. In such a situation, it is not possible to separate completely efficiency analysis from distribution issues: as a changes and one moves along the utility frontier, Paretoefficient choices will also change. This is rather undesirable. Improving the normative role of economic analysis thus requires a joint investigation of distribution issues and efficiency issues. It indicates a need to go beyond Pareto optimality. This can be done by complementing the Pareto optimality criterion by some additional criterion that provides a basis for choosing a single point on the Pareto-efficient utility frontier. More specifically, there is a need to introduce explicitly the evaluation of distribution issues in welfare analysis . This is done next by relying on a fairness criterion .
Fairness
Much research has been done exploring the concept of fairness in economics and welfare analysis (Foley; Rawls; Kolm; Varian; Feldman and Kirman; Pazner; Pazner and Schmeidler 1974, 1978; Crawford; Goldman and Sussangkarn; Thomson; Thomson and Varian; Baumol) . The standard definition of fairness is presented next. DEFINlTlON 
Fairness is defined as the absence of envy. A group is said to be characterized by the absence of envy if no individual would prefer to have what another has.
The concept of fairness is appealing for several reasons: it provides an intuitive basis for analyzing distribution issues, it exhibits symmetry across individuals, it is consistent with an ordinal representation of individual preferences, and it is free of interpersonal comparison of utility. Indeed, fairness only requires each individual to evaluate others' bundle using his/her own (ordinal) preferences. Using fairness as a reasonable equity criterion has thus appeared attracti ve in the analysis of alternati ve welfare and resource distribution s.
Some difficulties with the concept of fair allocation have been pointed out in the literature. As shown by Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) rion is not al ways consistent with the Pareto efficiency criterion in a production economy. For example, this can happen when individuals with superior abil ity also exhibit a strong preference for leisure (see Pazner and Schmeidler 1974) .
In this paper, we will rely on the concept of fairness-equivalence proposed by Pazner. Pazner (p. 463) defines an allocation to be fairequivalent if there exists a fair allocation in some hypothetical economy in which each individual enjoys the same welfare level as that enjoyed by him/her at the allocation under consideration. This approach has several attractive features: (a) it is consistent with an ordinal representation of individual preferences; (b) it is free of interpersonal comparison of preferences ; and (c) it is consistent with the Pareto optimality criterion (see below).
First, we need to define a hypothetical fair economy. Being motivated in part by Rawls 's work, we make two modifications to the analysis presented in the previous section. First, we introduce explicitly the possibility of transfers. We assume that these transfers take the form of ex ante monetary transfers. For the ith individual, denote a monetary transfer by the scalar Wi' where Wi > ° « 0) means an ex ante income transfer to (from) the ith individual, i = 1, ... , n. [&o a(w) , ZO(w) ] the solution to the maximization problem (7). It is clear that the hypothetical allocation Uoa(O), ZO(O») is fair. Indeed , in the abse nce of tran sfers in (7) (Wi = 0, i = 1, ... , n), all the individuals receive the same utility-yielding goods (y. h), thus necessarily implying the absence of envy within the group. It follows that, V(O) is the ex ante utility for any individual under a fair allocation.
We propose to use the hypo thetical fair allocation given in (7) to define fair-equivalent allocat ion s. For that purpose. consider the ith individual's ex ante willingness-to-receive wi', which sat isfie s the following relationship:
Equation (8) Thus, an allocation is fair-equivalent if it is feasible [i.e. , satisfies equations (1) and (2») and if its benefits (as measured by the willingness-to-
• Note that eq uation (7) does not require cap il al x or la bor I 10 be equally distribUied among the 11 individuals. tn other words, we do not require an equa l distribution of resource s in our characterizalion of fai rness.
receive w/) are equally distributed among the n individuals, using (p O, z a) as a fair hypothetical reference point. From equation (8), the fairequivalent allocation (P, Z) generates the same welfare levels as the hypothetical fair allocation given by (PO, za) and the willingnes s-to-receive: WI* = w;*, i = 2, ... , n. This definition is general in the sense that it applies to any feasible allocation, including allocations that are not Pareto efficient. It also indicates that any situation where the wi*'s vary across individuals is not fair-equivalent.
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The next question concerns the existence of an allocation (p, Z) that is both efficient and fair-equi valent. The proof can be obtained by construction (see Pazner and Schmeidler 1978) . First, consider the feasible allocation [pO(O) , ZO (O) ] just discussed; it is both feasible and fair. Except in the trivial case where it happens to be Pareto optimal, this allocation will generate a utility vector U = (VI' ... , V,,) that is in the interior of the utility possibility set bounded by the utility frontier. Under continuity, it is clearly possible to move from this allocation toward the utility frontier. Since this move can be made in any positive direction (in the utility space), it can generate any distribution of relative individual net gains. One of these positive directions corresponds to a fair allocation generating equal transfers w/ > 0 for all J1 individuals. If such a move is made all the way to the utility frontier, it neces sarily generates a fair-equivalent and efficient allocation. This implies that a fairequivalent and efficient allocation always exists. In other word s, there is a point a* in (4) such that the corresponding allocation satisfies both the efficiency criterion and the fairness-equivalence criterion. And if equation (4) has a unique solution for p and Z, then p+ and Z+ in (9) are unique allocations. In this case, the efficient and fair-equivalent allocation (P+' Z+) provides a basis for making specific recommendations to policy makers. To the extent that fairness-equivalence is a relevant concept, this can significantly improve the normative usefulness of economic analysis.
Under efficiency and fairness-equivalence, p+ give s the optimal information structure among the n individuals. It is worth pointing out here that the endogeneity of the information structure can be quite useful. For example , equation (2) can be interpreted as reflecting how information p is produced as the outcome of a learning process. In this context, learning cost involves the opportunity cost of time used in information gathering activities among the n individuals . Being efficient, p+ in (9a) must maximize the net social value of information (i.e ., information benefit minus its cost). This is consistent with the extensive literature on the economic s of information. And being fairequival e nt, p+ in (9a) must be such that the willingness-to-recei ve Wi * is identical across individuals. This means that the information gathering activities must contribute to equalizing the w;* 's, suggesting that the learning process plays a significant role in the evaluation of fairness . This stresses the importance of information management in collective decisions (e.g ., negotiation s in bargaining, or lobbying in policy making) . Since efficiency and fairness-equivalence can always be made consistent with each other (from proposition 3), this suggests the possibility of combining them together in economic analysis. This can be done as follow s: (0) The maximin characterization (10) exhibits a number of close s imil ar itie s with Rawls's Theory of Justice. Indeed , Rawls proposed a similar maximin criterion as a measure of social welfare . E x pr ess ion (10) shows that a ma ximin princ iple can lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation. It also suggests that the Ra wlsian " original position" corresponds to the ex ante situation where there is no information a llowing a distinction among individu als. Thi s I S consistent with Rawls 's " veil of ignorance."
Some Illustrations
The model presented in the previous sections is quite general. As such, it can be appl ied to a variety of situations. In this section, we explore its usefulness through several application s.
An Agricultural Economy
We consider first a simple agricultural economy where the production decisions involve labor and land allocation used in the production of food. We will assume that land is a necessary input so that no food can be produced without land. Food production can take place under alternative property rights. Here , we consider a simple case of land rights , where property rights for land are either pri va te propert y (where land is privately owned by individuals in the group) , or collective property (where land is co))ecti vely owned).9 The issue is then to choose how much land to aUocate to each individual as private property, and how much land to reserve as collectively owned . Let the vector of capital goods be x = (XI' ... , X"' x n + l ) ;::: 0 , where X ; denotes the quantity of land assig ned pri vate ownership to the ith indi vidual, i = 1, ... , n , and where X ,,+ I is the quantity of land tI See Chavas a nd Coggins for a more detailed discussion of the maxim in cr il erio n (10) in Ihe a ll oca lion of public goods.
A m e l: 1. Agl". Econ.
assigned collective ownership to the g roup . Denote by L > 0 the total amount of land available. The allocation of land rights mu s t sa ti sfy the constraint
As a result of land allocation , we thu s hav e (n + 1) possible farms : one collective farm associated with the collective land X,,+I, and 11 private farms , the ith private farm being associated with X;, the land owned by the ith individual, i = 1,2, .. . , n .
The production decisions also involve labor allocation on the (n + 1) farms. For the ith individual , this means choosing between working on his/her own farm, working on someone else's farm, or working on the collective farm. Denote by ti) ;::: 0 the amount of labor spent by the ith individual working on the jth farm, j = 1, ... , n + 1. Then, t;; corresponds to "family labor" on the ith farm, while eL;,,} t;) is "hired la- The production technology involves using the land resource L along with the labor pro vided by the n individuals to produce food . For s implic ity, assume th a t the food output is a standard product across farms.!' Denote by q( p , t, x, em) ;::: 0 the aggregate produ c tion function for food produced in all (n + 1) farms in the mth s tate of nature. Farm output is di stributed for consumption y; ;::: 0 a mong the n individu als, implying the followin g co nstra int:
The feasible set in (2) then takes the form It follows that the fair and efficient allocation given by equation (10) becomes (15) 
At "
Under some weak regularity conditions,12 the where constrained optimization problem (15) can be equivalently expressed in terms of the following saddle-point problem: ILm(q(p, t(e",), x(e",) Note that expression (16) can be alternatively expressed as 12 The ex istenc e of a saddle-point in (16) is guaranteed if Slater's condition is satisfied . such that there e xis ts a fea s ibl e point for which the nonlinear constraints are nonbinding. and if appropriate convexity conditions are satisfied so that the Lagrange multipliers (0, y, A) can defin e a sep a rating hyperplan e (see Takaya ma).
with tfl+2 = {t i .n+2: i = 1, ... , n} and Tj = (tij(e",): i = 1, ... , n ; m = 1, ... , M}, j = 1, ... , n + 2. The lL's, 8's , and is being shadow prices, the function n(-) defined in (17b) can be interpreted as an aggregate profit function associated with the production inputs (x, (t i / i = 1, ... , n;j = 1, ... , n + 1)). Equation (17b) holds under general conditions that allow for a joint production process as represented by equation (13). Equation (16) or (17) generate a general equilibrium efficient allocation under fairnessequivalence among the n individuals. And equation (17a) has the intuitive interpretation of providing a monetary evaluation of economic activities. The objective function in (17a) decomposes economic value into five additive terms: (a) the aggregate profit function n (-) given in (17b) and min; {nw;), the aggregate value of information associated with replacing the fair hypothetical allocation (SO", z a) by the efficient and fair-equivalent allocation (tJ+, Z+) .
A Special Case
How does equation (16) or (17) ' Xj ' em) being the food production function on the jth farm in the mth state, and get!. n+2, ... , 1 11 • 11 + 2 ) reflecting how the information gathering activities (t1 . 1I+2, ... , til. ,1+2) influence the information structure tJ. Compared to (13), the production process represented by (18) is restrictive in several ways:
. 1. The production process in (18) is nonjoint
In the sense that food output and information output are produced independently of each other. This restricts food production and learning to be separate processes (e.g., excluding the possibility of "learning by doing" ).
2. In (18), property rights x are assumed to have no influence on the information structure tJ· This neglects possible interaction effects between social organization (e.g., the nature of property rights) and the information used in resource allocation.
3. In (18), the production function of each farm is independent of decisions made on other farms. This rules out the presence of possible externalities across farm s . equation (19b) becomes the standard profit maximizing condition for each farm under competitive markets, taking the prices (AI' 0 1 , YI) as exogenous. In such a situation, provided that (AI ' 0 1 , YI) = (AI *' 0 1 *, yn, it is both efficient and fair-equivalent for each farm to maximize profit. However, this result obtained under (18) does not hold in general under (13) . This is further discllssed below.
Some Implications
Our analysi s has some interesting implications . First , it provides a basis for answerin a the . b
questIOn: Can a market mechani sm lead to an efficient and fair-equivalent allocation? A general an swer is yes, it can . This would be the case if competitive markets for food , land , and labor generate actual market prices equal to the shadow prices (A*, 0"" 1"), and if the allocation (tJ , Z) is chosen in a way consistent with (16) or (l7). However, the conditions for this to occur are fairly stringent. For example, it would require that market prices are state-dependent and that they vary across states of nature according to the distribution (AI *' ... , AM*; 0 1 " ', •• • , OM*; YII * ' ... , Y-,M*)· A complete set of competitive commodity and risk markets can in principle meet this requirement. This is the ArrowDebreu world of complete competitive markets. However, in the real world, risk markets are typically incomplete , implying the absence of prices in the mi ssing markets . In such a situation, it is not likely that a marke t mechanism will generate an efficient and fair-equivalent allocation. Thi s is consistent with Newbery and Stiglitz's analy s is . Newbery and Sti g litz have shown that, in general under ri sk aver s ion. commodity markets alone do not generate a Pareto -optimal allocation of resources. Since their results apply for any efficient allocation , they also apply to our allocation (that is both efficient and fair-equivalent). However, our analysis goes beyond Newbery and Stiglitz's in the sense that there exist market allocation s that are efficient but unfair. In this case, advocating a "market allocation" on the ground of efficiency alone (e.g. , in pricing or trade policy) can have adverse distributional impacts leading to unfair allocations. This does not mean that market allocations are undesirable. Rather, this suggests that, if fairness is a relevant concept, one would not want to rely exclusively on a market mechanism to allocate resources. This is illustrated in our above example where we endogenized the distribution of land rights and generated an allocation that is both fair-equivalent and Pareto-efficient. Second, our analysis suggests possible directions to improve economic analysis. For example, we have noted that (l7b) is not always consistent with farm-level profit maximization given in (19). This can happen in the presence of externalities across farms, a subject that is receiving growing attention (e.g., soil erosion, water pollution). It can also happen when the information structure tJ is influenced by social interactions among individuals. The investigation of such issues deserves more attention. In particular, economists would greatly benefit from a better understanding of the linkages between property rights and information, along with their implications for efficiency and fairness. By endogenizing both information and property rights, the model presented above should prove useful for that purpose.
Third, our analysis provides some insights into the following issue: can a nonmarket mechanism generate an efficient and fairequivalent resource allocation? Again, a general answer to this question is yes , it can . In a sense, this is directly implied by expressions (15) or (16) , where no explicit market mechanism was assumed. In this case, the optimal allocation (&D+, Z+) in (15) or (16) can be interpreted as being associated with "optimal contracts" among the n indi viduals. Such contracts can be " private contracts" between individuals (e.g ., within a firm or household) as well as "social contracts" (e.g., corresponding to government policy). This is consistent with the Coase theorem, which states that contracts can generate an efficient allocation of resources (Coase) . Our results can be interpreted as an extension of the Coase theorem in two ways. First, in contrast with Coase's analysis, we allow for imperfect information, transaction costs (e .g., information cost), as well as nonzero income effects. Second, we address explicitly distribution issues through our fairness criterion. Our results thus suggest that, in principle, appropriately designed contracts can generate a fair-equivalent and efficient allocation. However, this would require that the contracts be state-dependent and satisfy Zk = Zk*(e",), k = 1, .. . , K, m = 1, ... , M . In the real world, the ability of contracts to reflect many states of nature is typically limited, reflecting in general the cost of processing information. In such a situation, it seems unlikely that contracts alone can generate an efficient allocation. Again, this should not be interpreted to mean that contracts are undesirable. Rather, this suggests that one should not rely exclusively on contracts alone as a basis for allocating resources .
By endogenizing both information &D and resource allocation Z, our approach can provide useful insights into the interactions between information, efficiency, and fairness in contract design. In bargaining as well as policy making, the precise way in which information &D is chosen can be of considerable interest. For example, lobbying activities are intended to influence directly the information used in policy decisions . In general, additional information can contribute to improved efficiency (see proposition 2). But it also affects fairness through the knowledge of distribution of net benefits associated with a particular action.
The above discussion suggests that both market and nonmarket mechanisms can contribute to an efficient and fair allocation. In general, assessing the relative advantage of each mechanism will depend on the particular situation considered. We would like to argue here that our endogenous treatment of information can give valuable insights into this issue. In general, a high cost of obtaining and processing information has negative effects on efficiency. First, the resources used in the learning process are typically diverted from other productive activities, thus contributing to an inward shift in the Pareto utility frontier. Second, if some information is deemed too costly to obtain, this reduces the ability to make state-dependent decisions, which also leads to an inward shift in the utility frontier (see proposition 2) . Thus, a desirable characteristic of an allocation is to obtain information at a relatively low cost. The relative efficiency of a mechanism will typically depend on the nature of its information technology, i.e., on its ability to generate a fine information structure tJ at low cost. If there are economies of scale across individuals in obtaining and processing information, then a centralized mechanism (e .g., government policy) would be appropriate. Examples include research, price information, national security, etc. Alternatively, in the absence of economies of scale in information generation, a decentralized mechanism would likely be more desirable (Hayek). This includes private contracts as well as market exchanges. Private contracts would appear appropriate when efficiency-improving contracts involve only a few individuals. Market exchanges would likely be preferable when standard contracts can be developed at low cost among a large number of individuals. In each case, the relative efficiency of a particular mechanism will be heavily influenced by its ability to process and respond to information in allocation decisions. And the information available about the distribution of net benefits across individuals will affect the fairness of the allocation.
SustainabililY
We now turn to the issue of sustainabi lity associated with long-term resource management. Such sustainability issues have been linked with both efficiency and intergenerational equity (e.g., Howarth and Norgaard). To the extent that equity across generations can be captured by fairness-equivalence, then our approach can provide a basis for analyzing sustainable management.
Consider the model developed above, where the n individuals belong to different generations. Under fairness-equivalence, we defined a fair hypothetical economy [represented by (7)] where each generation enjoys the same ex ante welfare level as that enjoyed under the current allocation. The hypothetical economy is based on the information structure tJ o' where individuals do not yet know which generation they belong to . Being fair, the associated allocation 2 n (0, PrJ in (7) necessarily implies the absence of envy across generations. The efficient and fair-equi valent allocation given in (10) can then provide a basis for evaluating sustainability issues. First, the model presented above may require some modifications. We assumed that w in (6) reflects monetary transfers. Because of inflation and the absence of long-term capital and risk markets , it is not clear that money remains the most effective way of transferring resources across generations . It may well be that some nonmonetary transfers become more effective in that context. Then w in (6) and the willingness-to-receive w;* in (8) would need to be interpreted in terms of these nonmonetary transfers.
Second , while all evaluations are made ex ante (i .e., based on the information available in the current generation) , in the presence of learning future generations will have access to better information. This amounts to evaluating now some of the options that will become available in the future. Some of forthcoming information will be "good news" (e.g ., the discovery of new technologies), and some will be "bad news" (e.g., the extinction of some species, soil erosion associated with violent rains, the spread of pesticide-resistant pests , etc.) . One could think of an "optimistic scenario" where technological progress will be rapid and new technologies will provide effective solutions to whatever economic problem arises. One could also think of a "pessimistic scenario" where resource depletion and a growing human population, coupled with some natural disaster (e.g., a widespread drought) would generate mass starvation and challenge man's survival. In the optimistic scenario, rapid technological progress will tend to make future generations better off. In such a situation, it may appear both efficient and fair-equivalent to exploit inten s ively current resources , without much conservation effort. In the pessimistic scenario, resource conservation would be a very important part of current policies, in an attempt to give future generations a chance of obtaining similar welfare levels as the current generation. In any case, future options and the effects of future uncertainty will be influenced by R&D policy (designed to stimulate future technological progress) as well as resource conservation policy. We can interpret sllch policies as being motivated by both efficiency and intergenerationa I equity considerations, trying to cope with future uncertainty by keeping future options opened and improving man's ability to deal with unforeseen contingencies. To the extent that fairness-equivalence is relevant, our model allows for a joint analysis of learning over time and resource allocation. By reflecting both efficiency and equity cons iderations across generations , it can provide a useful basis for analyzin g resource sustainability issues.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented a general model that incorporates both efficiency and equity considerations in economic analysis. Efficiency is based on the Pareto optimality criterion, an intuitive concept that is widely accepted among social scienti sts and policy makers. Our treatment of equity is based on the intuitive notion of fairness, where each individual fails to envy any other individual. Following Pazner and Schmeidler, we proposed a fairness-equivalent criterion as the basis to evaluate distribution issues. Fairness-eq u i valence prov ides a nice complement to efficiency in the sense of always being consistent with Pareto optimality. It involves a hypothetical fair economy in which no information is available about each individual's characteristics. This is similar to Rawls's "initial position." The model provides useful insights into the role of information and property rights in resource allocation. This is illustrated in the context of an agricultural economy and in the investigation of sustainable resource management.
The relevance of our model can be compared with other models addressing both allocation and distribution issues. A leading competing model is Nash's bargaining model (e.g., Nash, Harsanyi) . Note that the Nash bargaining model requires cardinal preferences, while our approach allows for more general ordinal preferences. Another advantage of our approach may be that the intuitive notion of fairness is easier to communicate to policy makers.
FinaJly, it should be noted that not all situations call for fairness . In general, fairness seems more likely to be appropriate in groups exhibiting advanced forms of a social contract. However, in the absence of such a contract, fairness may not be a relevant criterion (e.g ., the case of conflicts or wars). At this point, there is clearly a need for empirical assessments of our proposed model. It is hoped that our approach will help stimulate such endeavors and improve economic analysis through the explicit incorporation of equity considerations.
